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ABSTRACT
Does risk attitude (aversion or attraction) vary with the level of the income at risk? About half of our
subjects chose to insure all levels, whereas another half chose instead not to insure low levels, but to
insure high levels.
Keywords:  Experimental economics, risk aversion, risk attraction, income risks.
JEL: C9, D83
1. Introduction
Our subjects were given a list of seven amounts of money, to be called Initial Experimental Incomes,
or IEI's. They were asked whether or not they would insure them. We wanted to learn in what way
the willingness to insure an IEI may depend on its amount.  If we may identify the decision to insure
with risk aversion, and the decision not to insure with risk attraction, then the question can be
rephrased as: Does the risk attitude (aversion or attraction) on IEI vary with the IEI? To the extent
that decisions regarding the insurance of experimental income reflect nonexperimental economic
decisions on insuring income risks, our results cast light on the possible dependence of the attitude
towards income risks on the level of the income at risk.
2. The experiment
We performed the experiment in a single session (no preliminary pilot sessions) using 21
undergraduates: we deliberately excluded any students in economics or business. Subjects were seated
in visually-isolated booths in the LeeX lab at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra. They were told that they
would receive at random one of the following amounts of money (or IEI’s), denominated in the
Spanish currency :  500, 1000, 2000, 5000, 7500, 10000 or 15000 (i.e., from US$3.50 to US$ 103).
Once the IEI was assigned, there was a 20% chance of losing it, but subjects could buy an actuarially
fair insurance against this loss
1. Subjects were asked to decide, before knowing the IEI obtained,
whether or not to insure each of the potential IEI’s.
To record their decisions, subjects were given a 7-page folder, one page for each possible IEI.
Every page had five boxes arranged vertically. The IEI was printed in the first box, and the insurance
premium in the second one, with the statement that the premium was exactly 20% of the IEI. The
third box contained two check cells, one for insuring the IEI, and another one for not insuring it.
Below a separating horizontal line, two more boxes were later used to record first whether the IEI
was lost and, and then the take-home amount. In order to facilitate decisions, a matrix on the back of
the page showed all the payoffs. The information was given to the subjects as written instructions
                                                       
1 We avoided extreme probabilities: 0.2 seems to be above the range that tends to be overweighed
(Preston and Baratta, 1948) and below the range that tends to be underweighed (0.3 to 0.8 according
to Cohen, Jaffray and Said, 1985).4
(available on request), which were read aloud by the experimenter. The experiment began after all
questions were privately answered.
Once all subjects had registered their decisions (under no time constraint: nobody used more
than 15 minutes), their pages were collected. Subjects were then called one by one to an office with
an urn that initially contained 21 pieces of paper: each piece indicated one IEI, and each of the seven
IEI’s occurred three times. A piece of paper was randomly drawn (without replacement): the
experimenter and the subject then checked in the folder whether she had insured that particular IEI. If
she had, then the premium was subtracted from the IEI to obtain the take-home amount. If she had
not, then a number from 1 to 5 was randomly chosen from another urn. If the number 1 was drawn,
then the subject would lose the IEI, taking nothing home. Otherwise, she would take home the IEI.
The subject was then paid and dismissed, and the next subject was escorted into the office.
The following element of the experiment was not included in the written instructions. As
described above, we asked subjects to consider several possible IEI’s for the sake of obtaining a
larger data set. This procedure tends to elicit the same choices as when subjects make only one choice
(Starmer and Sugden, 1991), but we wanted to check this tendency. Consequently, we allowed each
subject to reconsider her reported decision after her IEI was selected. Of the 21 subjects involved,
only one, labeled G, changed his mind (from non-insurance to insurance, at the borderline between his
previous noninsurance and insurance decisions). This observation seems insufficient to negate the
overall reliability of hypothetical decisions as accurate descriptions of real choices, but it does
exemplify a higher likelihood of risk aversion in played games (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1990).
3. Results
See Table 1. Each row corresponds to the decisions to insure (y) or not to insure (n) the seven IEI’s
by each one of the 21 subjects, who are labeled A to U. For example, an “y” in column 2000, row A,
means “subject A decides to insure the amount w if w is 2000”. A capital letter indicates the IEI that
the corresponding subject received. As explained, subject G, after he obtained the IEI of 5000 and
was allowed to reconsider, did switch to insurance.5
IEI
Subject
 500 1000 2000 5000 7500 10000    15000
A y y y Y y y y
B n N n y y y y
C Y y y y y y y
D n N n y y y y
E n y y n y Y y
F n n y Y y y y
G n n n n ﬁ Y y y y
H y y Y y y n y
I y y y y Y y y
J n n n y y Y y
K y y Y y y y y
L n y n y y y Y
M y y y y y y Y
N y y y y y y Y
O n Y y y y y y
P Y y y y y y y
Q n n n y n N y
R y y Y y y y y
S Y y y y y y y
T y y y y Y y y
U n y y y Y y y
Table 1. Decisions taken by the 21 subjects to insure (y) or not to insure (n) the seven IEI’s.6
4. Analysis
We claim that Table 1 supports the following assertion.
Fact I. In the aggregate, the decision to insure is positively correlated with the level of IEI.
Note, first, that all subjects insure the highest IEI (15000). Second, from Table 1 we can
construct the following Table, which shows an positive relation (with a single exception at the IEI of
10000) between a common value for IEI and the fraction of people that would chose to insure.
If Everybody’s Initial
Experimental Income Were
Then the Fraction of People That
Would Choose to Insure Would Be
w = 500 0.524
w = 1000 0.714
w = 2000 0.714
w = 5000 0.952
w = 7500 0.952
w = 10000 0.905
w = 15000 1.000
Table 2
Third, consider a probit regression model with random intercept (to allow for dependency
among observations of the same subject), specified as
F
-1(p) = a + b ln w,    a ~ N(a, s
2),
(F denotes the cumulative normal N(0,1) distribution function, and p the probability of  insuring)
where all the observations in the same row of Table 1 are assumed to correspond to the same
realization of the random variable a. The estimation of the model yields the following results; observe,




z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
b 0.552 0.127 4.340 0.000 (0.303   , 0.802)
a -3.383 1.031 -3.281 0.001 (-5.405   , -1.362)
Table 3.
Looking now at each row of Table 1, we find two well-represented patterns, and two
infrequent ones.
Pattern 1: always yes. Subjects displaying this pattern buy fair insurance at any level of IEI.
This is the most frequent pattern, displayed by 10 subjects, or 47.6 % of the subject pool.
Pattern 2: no-yes. A subject displaying this pattern does not buy insurance if the IEI is low,
but she does if it is high. This pattern is the second most frequent one: subjects B, D, F, G, J, O and U
(33.3% of the pool) display it.
Pattern 3: no-yes-no-yes. This pattern appears as a distant third (subjects E, L and Q, or 14.3
% of the pool). Pattern 3 is a variation on Pattern 2: do not buy insurance if IEI is low, and buy if IEI
is high. But Pattern 3 has an added twist for medium IEI’s: insure medium-low, but not medium-high,
IEI’s.
Pattern 4: yes-no-yes. Subject H chose to insure every amount of IEI except 10000.
The pattern frequencies imply the following facts.
Fact II. Different people may display different insurance patterns.8
Fact III. A large majority (Patterns 1 and 2, totaling 80.9% of the sample) satisfy the
following rules:
(a) if they insure the IEI w, then they also insure any w' > w;
(b) if they do not insure the IEI w, then they do not insure any w' < w.
  Fact IV. A large minority (Pattern 1, 47.6%) chooses to insure all levels of IEI.
Fact V. An equally sized minority (47.6%) chooses instead not to insure low levels of IEI, but
to insure high levels; 70% within this group (Pattern 2) switch from not insuring to insuring only
once, whereas the remaining 30% (Pattern 3) display a further reversal for intermediate levels of
IEI.
5. Risk attitudes and the shape of the utility function
We shall identify risk aversion with the decision to insure IEI at a fair premium, and risk attraction
with the decision not to insure. Strictly speaking, either insurance or noninsurance are compatible with
risk neutrality, and we cannot rule out risk neutrality in our subjects, particularly in those who switch
more than once (Patterns 3 and 4). But our presentation disregards the knife-edge case of risk
neutrality because we think that, on average, it is unlikely. Indeed, under risk neutrality the subject
should be indifferent between insuring or not, and, therefore, the YES or NO answers would basically
be chance variations. Yet the likelihood that our complete sample consists of random variations is
statistically indistinguishable from zero.
  Contrary to a long tradition in experimental economics, we made no attempt to test the
expected utility theory, and we have nothing to contribute on this issue. But our results can be
expressed in the language of the utility or value functions that appear in expected utility theory or
some of its generalizations.
Write W ” {500, 1000, 2000, 5000, 7500, 10000, 15000}, the set of the seven possible IEI’s.
For each w ˛ W, experimental subject i chooses either [w with prob. 0.8 & 0 with prob. 0.2] or [0.8 w
for sure]. Write X ” {0, 400, 500, 800, 1000, 1600, 2000, 4000, 5000, 8000, 10000, 12000, 15000},
                                                                                                                                                                        
2 These standard errors are robust against the misspecification of the distribution of the random
variable a.9
the set of the 15 conceivable take-home money amounts. Assume that, given i,  there are 15 real
numbers, denoted ui(x), x ˛ X, such that, for w ˛ W,
0.8 ui(w) + 0.2 ui(0) < ui(0.8 w),
whenever i chooses to insure the IEI w, and
     0.8 ui(w) + 0.2 ui(0) > ui(0.8 w),
otherwise. Writing ui for the function that assigns ui(x) to x, x ˛ X, the first (resp. second) inequality
is equivalent to the concavity (resp. convexity) of ui on the domain {0, 0.8 w, w}. Thus, a particular
sequence of seven "y" or "n" can be reworded as a sequence of seven expressions "concavity on {0,
0.8 w, w}" or "convexity on {0, 0.8 w, w}".
These sequences can be naturally associated with the curvature patterns of a smooth function
defined on a real interval. First, Pattern 1, which now corresponds to "concavity for all domains of the
type {0, 0.8 w, w},” is naturally associated to a concave function, as in Figure 1, whereas Pattern 2
can be associated with convexity for low x and concavity for high x, see Figure 2. The less frequent
Patterns 3 and 4 can naturally be associated with Figures 3 and 4, respectively. Our experimental
results now support the following claim:






























% of our subjects.
6. Relation to the literature
Figures 1-4 can be compared to some shapes of utility or value functions present in the literature,
although under substantive qualifications concerning the various interpretations (and allowable signs)
of the variable in the horizontal axis. Of course, in our case the variable is the take-home amount of
money, a nonnegative number.
Figure 1 is the conventional one. Our Figure 4 is Figure 3 of Friedman and Savage (1948),
who interpreted the variable on the horizontal axis as the total wealth of the decision maker. As noted,
this shape does show up in our experiment, but only once.10
Figures 2 and 3 are of more interest. The shape in our Figure 3 is the one in Markowitz's
(1952) Figure 5, but he interpreted the horizontal axis as deviations from a reference point, variously
called "present wealth" or "customary wealth,” with the zero placed at inflection point I* of our
Figure 3. Note that, if restricted to the right of point I*, then our Figure 3 (as well as Markowitz's
Figure 5 when restricted to the positive half-axis) has the shape of our Figure 2 (same as Markowitz's
Figure 4).
Which one of the patterns we observe is in line with Markowitz's ideas? The answer depends
on how one translates Markowitz's reference points into our experimental setup, and, in particular, on
whether his reference point is viewed as changing with our IEI.
Markowitz (page 155) identifies the reference point with  “customary wealth”. Its natural
counterpart here is the aggregate, nonexperimental wealth of the subject. Under this interpretation,
the origin of our x axes coincides with that of Figures 4 and 5 in Markowitz, and his view agrees with
Pattern 2 of our experiment, because his Figure 4 has the shape of our Figure 2.
But he also discusses potential discrepancies between “present wealth” and “customary
wealth.” “Present wealth” could certainly be translated here as the subject’s nonexperimental wealth
(same as “customary wealth”). But another interpretation is conceivable, where “present wealth”
equals the sum of the subject’s nonexperimental wealth and the IEI. If the take-home amount x
deviates from the IEI w (due either to the payment of the insurance premium or the loss of an
uninsured w), then the relevant argument in Markowitz’s formulation is x - w, a negative number, and
the relevant half of the horizontal axis in his Figure 5 is the negative half, where we see risk aversion
for small absolute values (low IEI), and risk attraction for large ones. This pattern has not been
observed in our experiment.
  Kahneman and Tversky (1979, Figure 3) follow Markowitz in drawing the utility curve (called
“value curve”) in terms of deviations from a reference point: they posit concavity for positive
deviations (gains) and convexity for negative ones (losses). Again, any harmony of their ideas with
our experimental findings crucially depends on how we interpret their notion of a  reference point, i.e.,
on what a gain or a loss is in the eyes of a subject. As in the previous paragraph, if the subject takes
her nonexperimental wealth as reference, then she views any take-home amount of money x as a gain.
Alternatively, if she takes the nonexperimental wealth plus the IEI w as reference, then she perceives x
- w as a loss.11
We see no reason to favor one of the two interpretations in our context. Imagine a subject
filling in her YES-NO answers, and contemplating the insurance of an IEI of 10000.  Does she think:
if I insure, I will gain only 8000? Or, on the contrary, does she think: if I insure, I will lose 2000?
In any event, if the reference point is taken to be the subject’s nonexperimental wealth, then
the relevant half of the horizontal axis of Kahneman and Tversky’s Figure 3 is the positive one, which
now agrees with our Figure 1. Alternatively, if the reference point is the sum of the nonexperimental
wealth and the IEI, then the relevant half-axis in their Figure 3 is the negative one, displaying
convexity for all levels of losses, a pattern not observed in our experiment. Of course, while
maintaining this interpretation of a reference point, one could modify their Figure 3 so that the
function becomes concave for x negative and large in absolute value: one would then obtain
something qualitatively similar to our Figure 2.
3
Figure 3 of Kahneman and Tversky (minus its kink) could be seen as a translation of our
Figure 2 where their zero is located at our I. Indeed, up to a horizontal translation, results consistent
with the shape of our Figure 2 appear in a variety of other work. Nonconvexity suggests indivisibility,
and the initial nonconvexity of our Figure 2 can be attributed to some indivisibility in the mind of the
decision maker, a “target level,”  “aspiration level” or “threshold” that induces risk-seeking behavior
below it.
                                                       
3  Because Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in addition postulate a “decision weight function” with
values that do not necessarily coincide with the probabilities, their model weakens the connection
between risk aversion and the concavity of the function.12
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